NOTE: His lawyer's name has been replaced with the title I prefer to call him "Asshat Rat Lawyer".
The record is replete with evidence that Wife could not afford to pay sanctions, for example, Wife’s Financial Affidavit (1 R. 63-69). Therefore, the “bite” of financial sanctions was too severe. One need only glance at her Financial Affidavit (1 R. 63-69) to realize that the only way she could afford an attorney would be if she borrowed the funds.
Wife’s Conduct Was Not Found to be Vexatious or Overly Litigious
While Mettler v. Mettler, 569 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) may grant a trial court the right to sanction based on vexatious and overly litigious actions; Husband’s logic regarding Rosen v. Rosen 696 So. 2d 697 (Fla. Supreme Ct. 1997) and Diaz v. Diaz, 727 So. 2d 954 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999) is flawed (Husband’s Brief, pg. 26). In Rosen – the authority in the matter of attorney’s fees – the court ruled that all relevant circumstances are to be considered by the trial court. Moreover, in the instant case, there is no order – prior to the Final Judgment – finding Wife’s conduct as such.
More importantly, until the final hearing, sanctions were never ordered on the Motions to Compel Deposition, for Protective Order, or for Contempt. Husband’s counsel testified at the final default hearing that sanctions for an entire litany of motions[1] (2 Tr. 15, lines 6-16) should be granted because he viewed them as “frivolous”. In actuality, there are only 2 orders in the record for Wife to pay sanctions: the Order Compelling [Wife’s] Discovery (1 R. 23) in the amount of $350, and the Order Granting Husband’s Motion to Strike (2 R. 242) “amount due shall be reserved for the Final Hearing”. Husband was ordered to pay sanctions to Wife in the amount of $350 in the Order Compelling [Husband’s] Discovery (1 R. 142).
The motion to strike is 3 pages long and the hearing lasted for 4 minutes. The deposition was scheduled for a 3 hour period. Husband’s counsel testified [1](2 Tr. 15, lines 16-18) that his office spent 15.35 attorney hours and 20.5 paralegal hours. The time Husband’s counsel alleges is unreasonable to begin with. But, more importantly, as previously stated in this Reply Brief, Husband charged $7,500 of his attorney’s fees to Wife’s account without her consent. Wife attached, as Exhibit I to her Motion for Reconsideration, the relevant bank statements showing these charges (2 R. 286 & 296). Unless the trial court assumed that Wife voluntarily agreed to pay the “Law Firm of [Asshat Rat Lawyer]” to represent Husband against her, one has to wonder why these charges were not addressed during the final hearing or upon the trial court's review of the Motion for Reconsideration.
Husband charged $7,500 of his legal fees to Wife’s account. He attributed those funds to Wife in his Equitable Distribution table requiring Wife to pay an “equalizing sum” which included those funds. He was awarded attorney’s fees in the amount of $10,155.50. Essentially, this judgment gives Husband the ability to double collect on $7,500 that should have been already attributed to him in his column of the Equitable Distribution table.
[1] Testimony of Asshat Rat Lawyer: “These are the fees and costs that, in our perspective, were due to frivolous litigation, vexatious litigation, litigation basically which was clearly not required but for the difficulty of the wife.
There was a motion to compel wife’s discovery. There was a motion to compel the wife’s deposition. There was a motion for wife’s contempt. There was a motion for protective order. There was wife’s video teleconference deposition no-show. There was a motion to strike the wife’s pleadings.”
2 Tr. 15, lines 16-18.
