APPEAL: THE ISSUES: 1st ISSUE - MARYLAND'S POINTS

STATEMENT OF IDENTITY AND INTEREST OF AMICUS CURIAE

      Amicus curiae is the Office of the Secretary of State for the State of Maryland. The Office of the Secretary of State administers the Maryland Safe at Home Address Confidentiality Program ("Program"), Md. Code Ann., Family Law §§ 4-519 - 4-530, which since its creation in 2006 has provided victims of domestic violence residing in Maryland a means of keeping their residential address confidential from their abusers.  Victims who qualify to be participants in the Program are provided with a substitute address (a P.O. Box) to use as their legal address for dealings with State and local government agencies.  In addition, the Address Confidentiality Program provides free mail forwarding for first-class mail and legal papers.  Appellant [Wife] has been a Program participant since September 2011.

     The State of Maryland has a strong interest in ensuring the effectiveness of the Address Confidentiality Program, both within the state and across state lines so that participants may be sufficiently protected from the serious physical harm that could result from exposing their residential address to their abusers.  Accordingly, the Office of the Secretary of State works continuously with government agencies, schools, businesses, and courts to keep participants' residential address confidential.  If an agency or court were to require the disclosure of a participant's address, these efforts would be for naught, and lives would be put at substantial risk.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

     With the Maryland Safe at Home Address Confidentiality Program, the State of Maryland has provided a critical tool for victims of domestic violence to use to shield their location from their abusers.  The effectiveness of the shield depends on the cooperation of government agencies, schools, businesses, and courts.  If any one of those entities fails to cooperate and the victim's location is consequently revealed, the entire value of the protection is lost.

     By statute, Maryland state and local agencies must abide by the Address Confidentiality Program upon the request of a Program participant, Md. Code Ann., Family Law § 4-526, but the Program relies on voluntary cooperation from those entities that state law does not reach. These include insurance companies, credit card companies, and utility companies operating both inside and outside Maryland, and courts operating outside Maryland.  If this Court or the court below orders disclosure of the residential address of a Program participant such as [Wife] for any reason, e.g., as part of a discovery request, or to any person, even to opposing counsel alone, it will mark the first time an entity has declined to cooperate with the Program.  It will also mark a major departure from longstanding principles of comity that operate among state courts.

     More importantly, failure by a Florida court to protect the confidentiality of a Program participant's residential address may put that participant's physical safety at risk.  The participant in this case, [Wife], was granted a court-ordered Final Judgment of Injunction for Protection against Domestic Violence without Minor Children as a result of alleged threats of physical violence against her. Husband v. Wife, No. 502011XXXXXXXXXXNB (Fla. Cir. Ct., 15th Jud. Cir., Palm Beach County, Mar. 15, 2011).  These alleged threats, sufficiently serious to convince a Florida court of the need to take immediate protective action, were also sufficiently serious to qualify her for enrollment in the Maryland Address Confidentiality Program after she relocated there.  As the entry of the Injunction for Protection attests, [Wife’s] fear for her physical safety is not unfounded, and she understandably considers her continued safety to be dependent on the confidentiality of her whereabouts. Indeed, the lower court's Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage with Property But No Dependent or Minor Children, Husband v. Wife, No. 502011XXXXXXXXXXXXNB (Fla. Cir. Ct., 15th Jud. Cir., Palm Beach County, June 18, 2012), which [Wife] understood to require disclosure of her residential address, caused her to relocate yet again.  Circumstances like these illustrate the importance of cooperating with the Program.  Finally, failure by a Florida court to protect the confidentiality of an ACP participant's residential address will send a signal to participants in Address Confidentiality Programs across the country that these programs are not dependable, that the participants therefore are not safe, and that their abusers need only find a sympathetic ear in another jurisdiction's court if they want to obtain their victim's address and track her down.  As a matter of both public policy and public safety, this Court should not allow such a precedent to be set.

ARGUMENT

I.      COMITY DEMANDS COOPERATION WITH MARYLAND'S STATUTORY CONFIDENTIALITY PROTECTIONS FOR DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS.

     Comity among the states is one of the founding principles of American law, enshrined in the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 ("The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."). As the Florida District Court of Appeals for the First District has written:

The Privileges and Immunities Clause sets out "a norm of comity" or "substantial equality of treatment." . . .See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660 & 665, 43 L. Ed. 2d 530, 95 S. Ct. 1191 (1975).  The Founding Fathers deemed it critical to unite the citizens of the various states into one union, and "it was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the citizens of each state upon the same footing with citizens of other states, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those states are concerned." Paul v. Virginia, 15 U.S. 168, 180, 19 L. Ed. 357 (1869).

     Reinish v. Clark, 165 So. 2d 197, 207 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 2000); see Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 523-24 (1978).  States maintain comity by enforcing laws passed by other states to ensure the fair and safe treatment of their citizens. Doing so "place[ s] the citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those States are concerned," Paul v. Virginia, 15 U.S. at 180, and also prevents states from discriminating against citizens of other states in favor of their own.  Id.; see Hague v. C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939).  Generally, a state only disregards comity when applying comity would contradict its own laws or be injurious to its citizens. See Flash, Lewis & Co. v. Conn, 16 Fla. 428, 428 (Fla. 1878) ('"Courts of justice in one State will, out of comity, enforce the laws of another State when by such enforcement they will not violate their laws or inflict an injury on some one of their own citizens.”’) (quoting 1 Bouvier's Law Dic. 244); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Enright, 258 So. 2d 4 72, 4 75 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 1972).

     Maintaining comity is particularly important in the area of domestic relations. See, e.g., Herron v. Passailaigue, 110 So. 539, 542 (Fla. 1926) (discussing the importance, as a matter of comity, of giving "full force and effect" to decrees of other states involving domestic relations ''unless there is some good and valid reason to the contrary"); Dep 't of Children & Families v. V. V., 822 So. 2d 555, 558 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2002) (finding that "principles of comity" demanded that a parental termination judgment from another state be recognized when "[n]o paramount rule of public policy dictates otherwise").  Accordingly, state laws and regulations pertaining to domestic relations, such as the statutorily-created confidentiality program at issue here, should be followed in other states, absent special circumstances.  Cf. Thomas v. Cleveland Mun. Sch. Dist., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6484, *13 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2006) ("Considerations of comity require the court to consider the confidentiality interests outlined under state law'').

     As explained above, Maryland provides domestic violence victims address confidentiality protection by statute, through the Maryland Safe at Home Address Confidentiality Program. Md. Code Ann., Family Law§§ 4-519-4-530. This protection is given only to those who provide credible, independently evaluated evidence of actual or threatened physical violence.  Id § 4-522 (Program applicants must provide some evidence that they or a person under their care are a victim of domestic violence and a statement that disclosure of their actual address would endanger their safety of the safety of their child); COMAR 01.02.11.03F; see § 4-513 (defining “victim of domestic violence"). Through administering the Address Confidentiality Program, Maryland furthers its compelling interest in protecting the health and safety of its citizens.  See State v. Sheldon, 332 Md. 45, 63 (Md. 1993) ("To be sure, the State has a compelling interest in protecting the social welfare of all its citizens.").

     Florida also provides domestic violence victims address confidentiality protection by statute, through a similar address confidentiality program. Fla. Stat. §§ 741.401-741.465.  It also provides these victims express statutory protection when filing a petition for injunction for protection against domestic violence.  Fla Stat. § 741.30(3)(b) (a petitioner "may furnish [her] address to the court in a separate confidential filing if, for safety reasons, the petitioner requires the location of the current residence to be confidential"); see Fla. R. Jud Adm. 2.420( d)(2).  In creating these statutory protections, the State of Florida has recognized the importance of protecting the health and safety of domestic violence victims within its borders. See Fla. Stat. § 741.401 (legislative findings about the need to protect from disclosure the locations of "persons attempting to escape from actual or threatened domestic violence" through relocation); see also In re Report of the Comm'n on Family Courts, 646 So. 2d 178, 182 (Fla. 1994) (“we recognize the extreme importance of having domestic violence issues addressed in an expeditious, efficient, and deliberative manner").

     Given that Florida shares Maryland's strong interest in protecting domestic violence victims through address confidentiality, and given that Florida has even enacted its own program to advance that interest, it would plainly violate the norms of comity for Florida to decline to give effect to Maryland's parallel address confidentiality program.  Doing so would deprive the Address Confidentiality Program participant of an advantage of her Maryland citizenship by removing the value of the Program's protection even in Maryland, because her abuser would now be able to track her down there.  Denying comity would also deprive the Program participant of the very same advantage of citizenship she would have enjoyed if she were a Florida citizen, thereby placing her on unequal footing with Florida citizens and effectively discriminating against her on the basis of her state of residence. See Paul v. Virginia, 15 U.S. at 180.  Surely no justification for this departure from comity can be identified here.

II.      FLORIDA'S FAILURE TO PROTECT MARYLAND ACP PARTICIPANTS' LOCATIONS FROM DISCLOSURE WILL PUT THEIR PHYSICAL SAFETY AT RISK.

     Failure by a Florida court to enforce Maryland's Address Confidentiality Program will not only threaten comity; it will implicate Florida courts in creating a threat to a Program participant's physical safety. Program participants are enrolled only after they provide credible evidence of actual or threatened physical violence.  See Md. Code Ann., Family Law § 4-513 ("'victim of domestic violence' means an individual who has received deliberate, severe, and demonstrable physical injury, or is in fear of imminent deliberate, severe, and demonstrable physical injury from a current or former spouse, or a current or former cohabitant").  For too many Program participants, their abusers have struck before and are determined to strike again.  Address confidentiality is therefore one of the only meaningful tools they have to break free from patterns of abuse and seek safe shelter. 

     From the point of view of Maryland's domestic violence victims, this protection is critical to their continued physical safety.  Nearly 1,000 individuals - including hundreds of children - have sought the protection of Maryland's Address Confidentiality Program since its inception in October 2006, with hundreds enrolling every year.  The value of address confidentiality protection to those who participate is demonstrated by their high re-enrollment rate:  The Maryland Address Confidentiality Program operates on four-year terms, and on average at least fifty percent of Program participants re-enroll after their initial term has expired.  Non-enforcement of the Maryland Program by courts in other states would put the physical safety of hundreds of men, women, and children at risk, and compel many of them to relocate, often at great personal cost. 

     It is not an exaggeration to say that non-enforcement of the Maryland Address Confidentiality Program will put participants' lives at risk, as well.  Many Program participants bear the bruises and scars of attempts on their lives, and, all too frequently, their abusers are willing and able to make those attempts eventually succeed.  [Wife]'s enrollment in the Program came after an alleged attempt on her life by her former husband, an act she claims was the latest in a series of physically abusive actions spanning several years.  This pattern of alleged abuse, when brought to the attention of Florida courts, warranted the issuance of an Injunction of Protection against Domestic Violence without Minor Children and eventually a Final Judgment of Protection.  Stories like hers are all too common among the Maryland Address Confidentiality Program participants.  Without a dependable, court supported means of protecting their locations from disclosure, these participants cannot be assured of their safety. Surely, Florida courts wish to avoid this outcome, particularly for a former Florida resident like [Wife]. See In re Certification of Need for Additional Judges, 889 So. 2d 734, 738 (Fla 2004) (discussing the value of "the court system to help ensure [domestic violence victims'] safety"); Stephens v. State, 659 So. 2d 1303, 1304 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1995) ("The hidden epidemic of domestic violence is a serious public safety and criminal justice problem which requires the courts to use a full range of available resources and tools.") (internal quotation and citation omitted).

III.      FLORIDA'S FAILURE TO PROTECT MARYLAND ACP PARTICIPANTS' LOCATIONS FROM DISCLOSURE WILL PUT THE PHYSICAL SAFETY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE VICTIMS ACROSS THE COUNTRY AT RISK.

     Finally, failure by a Florida court to enforce Maryland's Address Confidentiality Program will also threaten the physical safety of domestic violence victims all over the country, not just those in Maryland.  In addition to Florida, thirty-six states have enacted address confidentiality programs of some form, with thousands of enrollees, and the effectiveness of all of these programs depends on their enforcement in other jurisdictions.  If Florida declines to protect the confidentiality of a Maryland victim's address, it will send a signal to address confidentiality program participants in all thirty-six states that their addresses are not truly safe from disclosure, and that, therefore, they are not truly safe. Worse, this signal will be sent by the judiciary, the very institution that many of these participants may be relying on to obtain divorces from their abusers, child custody, and other legal remedies.  Without confidence in courts to protect their whereabouts, many of these participants may be deterred from seeking needed relief for themselves and justice for their abusers.

     For Floridian domestic violence victims desperate to relocate to safety in a place far from their abusers, non-enforcement of another state's address confidentiality program may suggest the need for them to stay put in Florida if they want address confidentiality protection, no matter the other safety risks involved. Interstate relocation by domestic violence victims is currently quite common, with [Wife] being just one example. The Maryland Address Confidentiality Program alone has dozens of participants who enrolled after relocating to Maryland from another state, and dozens more who have relocated to states outside Maryland while still remaining enrolled in Maryland's Program. Non-enforcement of a state's address confidentiality program in another state will discourage program participants from crossing state lines to escape their abusers, thereby further limiting victims' ability to pursue alternatives to enhance their security. 

     Finally, and most troubling, failure by a Florida court to protect Maryland Address Confidentiality Program participants' locations from disclosure will invite a perverse type of forum shopping.  Abusers from across the country will interpret such an action as an indication that Florida courts are unlikely to conceal the location of any non-Florida domestic violence victim.  Accordingly, those who are dead-set on tracking down their victims may relocate to Florida, establish residence there, and file an action in a Florida court that entails disclosure of their victim's address.  Thus, no matter where domestic violence victims relocate, and no matter whether the state where they relocate has an address confidentiality program, they will not be able to protect themselves from having their whereabouts disclosed, so long as their abusers can avail themselves of Florida courts.  This result must be avoided, both as a matter of public policy and as a matter of public safety.

CONCLUSION

     For the reasons stated, the Office of the Secretary of State for the State of Maryland urges this Court to honor Maryland's Address Confidentiality Program by preventing the court-ordered disclosure of [Wife]’s residential address.  Protecting the confidentiality of her address throughout these proceedings will best ensure her physical safety, the safety of Florida domestic violence victims who may need to relocate out of state, and the safety of domestic violence victims already under the protection of other states' address confidentiality programs.

APPEAL: THE ISSUES: 1st ISSUE - MY REPLY TO HIS ANSWER

Excerpted from my Reply Brief, this is my final counter to his Answer to my first Issue presented on appeal.

NOTE:  The names of my attorneys in the footnote have been removed.  

I.  The Trial Court Did Deny Wife’s Motion for Protective Order In Regards to Her Home and Work Addresses

Propriety Of Review

Husband appears to challenge the propriety of reviewing the trial court’s ruling (Husband’s Brief, pg.14) but such review is not prohibited in a plenary appeal. Charneco v. Gayda, 72 So. 3d 199, 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) “Although I find the trial judge's order to be a departure from the essential requirements of law, I see no reason why the harm that will result from the order cannot be corrected on plenary appeal.” Following from that decision, the order in the instant case may also be reviewed during this plenary appeal.

The Order Was Never Stipulated To By Wife’s Counsel

Husband contends that the trial court did not deny the motion and that an Agreed Order was entered (Husband’s Brief, pg. 14). During the hearing, the trial court specifically found: “I’m going to deny the Motion for Protective Order.” (1 Tr. 5, lines 5-9) With Wife’s counsel’s insistence, the trial court asked Husband’s counsel, as a courtesy, if he would be willing to refrain from giving Wife’s address to his client (1 Tr. 6, lines 1-4 ). The trial court refused to protect Wife’s work address, and declared its findings an “agreed order” (1 Tr. 7, line 15). Wife’s counsel did not stipulate to the agreement and further objected in her Motion in Opposing (2 R. 243).

As adduced in her Brief (Wife’s Brief, pg. 24), disclosing Wife’s work address to an abusive Husband is tantamount to disclosing her home address. Wife does not drive and commutes via public transportation, which would allow Husband to easily follow her home. De facto, therefore, the motion was denied.

Geographical Distance Between The Parties

Husband makes note of the fact that Husband and Wife live hundreds of miles away from each other (Husband’s Brief, Pg. 7) as if to persuade that the geographical distance between them should have dissipated Wife’s fear of further abuse by Husband. Hundreds of years ago, when travel was arduous and difficult, Husband may have had a valid point. In modern times, Husband can literally board a plane and be on Wife’s doorstep within a couple of hours.

Certainly, Husband was aware of Wife’s residence while she lived in the marital home in Florida. He lived in the same home with her until he was arrested. Wife relocated ten weeks after his arrest to escape Husband’s further abuse^[1] and financial misconduct^[2] as detailed in Wife’s Brief (Wife’s Brief, pg. 25).

Domestic Violence

Husband contends that domestic violence was first alleged by Wife subsequent to her relocation (Husband’s Brief, pg. 5). Husband was arrested on March 14, 2011 for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (2 R. 210-218, Wife’s Brief, pgs. 1-2). During the final hearing, Husband testified (2 Tr. 8, line 2) that Wife relocated during the first week of June, 2011 – which was ten weeks after his arrest for domestic violence.

Husband further contends there is no evidence of domestic violence in the record (Husband’s Brief, pg. 15). In reality, the record is abundant with references to the domestic violence Husband perpetrated against his Wife beginning with Husband’s filing of the related cases (1 R. 5-6) involving the criminal felony charges against him for domestic violence, and the Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence. The majority of Wife’s pleadings and one of Husband’s, along with 3 of the 5 hearings^[3], refer either to domestic violence or the Injunction^[4].

Timing of Filing

Husband speciously protests the timing of Wife’s Motion for Protective order filing (Husband’s Brief, pg. 14). Litigation was initiated by Husband in March 2011 (1 R. 1-4). The parties filed discovery requests upon each other respectively (1 R. 15-28). Neither party made any attempt to enforce discovery until almost a year later. There was no reason for a protective order of her address while Wife lived in the marital home, and since she worked for the family business for many years, there was no reason to protect her employer’s address. After Wife relocated because of Husband’s continuing abusive misconduct in regards to her mail and finances, it became necessary to protect her from any such further actions. Wife began working a temporary position and protection of her employer’s address also became necessary (2 R. 208-218). Wife had good cause to seek protection (c.f. Laughon v. Jacksonville Sheriff’s Office, Dist. Court, M.D. Fla. 2007: “Nevertheless, if the party seeking protection can establish good cause for an untimely motion, the Court may grant relief the relief sought.”)

Wife’s Legal Representation During the Case
Husband contends Wife was represented by 5 successive attorneys (Husband’s Brief, pg. 4). In reality, the record demonstrates that Wife was represented by 3 attorneys prior to August 10, 2011 (1 R. 49; 1 R. 50; 1 R. 54). Thereafter, she represented herself pro se for more than 8 of the 16 months this action was pending^[5]. Wife retained a 4th attorney^[6] on April 16, 2012.

---

^[1]  Turning off water and garbage collection in the marital home which made it impossible for Wife to continue to live therein (Wife’s Brief, pg. 4).

^[2]  Confiscating Wife’s mail from the mailbox, followed by changing her mailing address to his new address and receiving her mail, without her consent.  Charging thousands of dollars in legal, personal and business expenses to Wife’s account.  Diverting the income from the family business to a new business established by Husband, without Wife’s knowledge or consent, thereby, depriving Wife of income.  (Wife’s Brief, pgs. 2-5)

^[3]  Husband’s Motion for Return of Status Quo (1 R. 29-30); Wife’s Counter Petition (1 R. 34-35); Wife’s Motion to Dispense with Mediation (1 R. 47); Wife’s Financial Affidavit (1 R. 69); Wife’s Response to Motion for Return of Status Quo (1 R. 75-76); Wife’s Motion for Temporary Relief (1 R. 139 & 140); Wife’s Motion for Protective Order (2 R. 208); Wife’s Motion in Opposing (2 R. 243); Wife’s Motion for Reconsideration (3 R. 256).

^[4]  1 Tr. 3, lines 20-23; 3 Tr. 4, lines 4-6; 5, 2 Tr. lines 6-8.

^[5]  Lawyer 1 and Lawyer 2 withdrew on April 26, 2011 and May 3, 2011, respectively.  Lawyer 3 represented Wife until August 10, 2010.

^[6]  Lawyer 4

APPEAL: THE ISSUES: 1st ISSUE - HIS ANSWER

Excerpted from his Answer Brief, this is his answer to my first issue.  I counter his answers in my final Reply Brief.

He begins a series of personal attacks towards me in the italicized section below.  That's really not something you want to do in an appeal.  Appellate judges really dislike it.



I.  The Trial Court Did Not Deny Former Wife’s Motion For Protective Order in Regard to Her Home and Work Addresses.

Summary

The Trial Court did not deny the Wife’s Motion For Protective Order. 2 R. 223-223. In fact, the parties entered into an Agreed Order, whereby the Wife’s Motion for Protective Order was granted in part. The Wife agreed to disclose her address to Former Husband’s counsel, and Former Husband’s counsel agreed not to disclose Former Wife’s address to the Former Husband. There is no issue here, since the resulting Order on Wife’s Motion for Protective Order was an Agreed Order, the Wife has absolutely no legal basis to appeal it. The parties entered in to the Agreed Order via their respective counsel, and there was no objection filed as to this Agreed Order, nor was a Motion to Vacate Order ever filed.


Argument

The Trial Court did not deny the Wife’s Motion For Protective Order. 2 R. 223-223. The Former Wife chooses to ignore the fact that the parties entered into an Agreed Order, whereby the Wife’s Motion for Protective Order was granted in part. The Wife agreed to disclose her address to Former Husband’s counsel, and Former Husband’s counsel agreed not to disclose Former Wife’s address to the Former Husband. There is no issue here, since the resulting Order on Wife’s Motion for Protective Order was an Agreed Order, the Wife has absolutely no basis to appeal it.

The Motion For Protective Order was not even filed by the Former Wife until May 14, 2012, which was approximately one month prior to the scheduled trial date. The filing of the Motion For Protective Order was a transparent, frivolous attempt to prevent the Husband from obtaining discovery which was material and necessary to the proper defense of the Wife’s claims for spousal support, equitable distribution and attorney’s fees and costs. The Wife’s living expenses and her employment information was material to the Husband’s defenses. On the one hand, the Wife wanted the Husband to pay her support, but then she refused to disclose her living situation, her expenses, her income, and most importantly, refused to allow the Husband to discover whether or not her assertions as to her claims for the items were true and correct. The court had already ordered the Wife to provide this information to the Husband time and time again. The Wife brought her Motion for Protective Order simply for the purpose of avoiding and evading production of mandatory discovery to the Former Husband, discovery which had been previously ordered to be provided to the Husband. The Former Wife sought to avoid providing answers to Standard Family Law Interrogatories under Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure form 12.930(b). Former Wife was duly served with Request for Standard Family Law Interrogatories and Request to Produce on March 22, 2011. 1 R. 7-14; 1 R. 15-15. She refused to comply with the requested disclosure in the time and manner prescribed by law, never filed any objections, nor did she request any extension of time.

The Former Wife, in her Amended Initial Brief, attempts to paint herself as an alleged victim of domestic violence. This is either simply a self-serving portrait of the Wife, or the ravings of a delusional individual, as there is absolutely nothing in the record indicating that she is a victim of domestic abuse. Even if there was, the designation would be completely irrelevant, as the parties entered into an agreed order as to the Wife’s Motion for Protective Order. The Wife, in her Amended Initial Brief, simply seeks to introduce new evidence to the court…she does not reference anything in the record other than her own unsubstantiated claims. Finally, since the Order was an Agreed Order, the Former Wife simply has no basis to appeal it.

APPEAL: THE ISSUES: 1st ISSUE - DENIAL OF MOTION FOR PROTECTIVE ORDER

The following is excerpted from my brief.  It's the first issue I cover, in regards to denying my motion for protective order in regards to address confidentiality. 

His Answer included personal attacks and he alleged that there was no domestic violence, of course, even though he was arrested for it!  In my final Reply Brief, I countered him on this issue again.  

I.  The trial court erred in denying a domestic violence victim’s protective order in regards to her home and work addresses.

Summary

Florida legislature has specifically amended its laws to protect domestic violence victims from ongoing abuse at the hands of their abusers.  While separating from and/or divorcing an abuser, a victim is in even more danger of homicide than while she lived with him.  Abusers will go to any length, including using the legal system, to find their victims.  Address Confidentiality Programs and Florida and federal statutes exist so that domestic victims can live safely, even during court proceedings, by maintaining their new addresses confidential from their abusers. 

Ordering Wife to disclose her home and work address denied her statutory and constitutional rights to defend her life and liberty and to enjoy happiness, and was clearly an abuse of discretion and a departure from the essential requirements of the law.

Argument

Several sections of Florida legislature have been specifically amended with the interest of keeping domestic violence victims’ addresses confidential. In amending Sections 741.30 and 784.046 of the Florida Statutes in regards to domestic violence, the Governor signed into effect on April 27, 2012, a bill which refers at Section 3 to the confidentiality of a domestic violence victim’s address:

“[I]f such information were publicly available, it could be used by the partner or former partner of the victim of domestic violence, … to determine the location of the victim, thus placing the victim in jeopardy.”
Committee Substitute for House Bill No. 1193, Chapter 2012-154, Section 3 (http://laws.flrules.org/files/Ch_2012-154.pdf accessed on 9/23/2012)

Florida Statute 119.071(2)(j)(1) also allows (upon written request of the victim of a crime) for confidentiality of any document that reveals the identity, home or employment telephone number, home or employment address.

Wife motioned the trial court for a protective order on May 15, 2012 (2 R. 208-218). As a victim of domestic violence, she was entitled, under Florida laws, to confidentiality of her home and work address.

The trial court was not versed in the Florida Statutes, nor familiar with any articles and statistics regarding domestic violence published over the past fifteen years – not even with those specifically aimed at Judges and the Florida legal community. The trial court apparently did not recognize that, in separating from her abusive husband, Wife faced even more danger than while she lived with him, and that, if Husband gained access to her new address, she would be placed in jeopardy of future abuse and/or homicide.^[1],[2]. By gaining access to her work address and/or the domestic violence agency at which she receives counseling, Husband could easily have followed her home on public transportation and thereby, discovered her home address.

Like many victims before her^[3], Wife had taken extraordinary measures (including relocating across country) to prevent her abusive Husband from finding and further abusing (or even killing) her. Wife believes that if her address is disclosed to him, Husband will cause her further harm, and he may well murder her.

Moreover, in ordering Wife to disclose her work address to Husband, the trial court did not understand that batterers commonly abuse their victims at work^[4]. Had Wife disclosed her work address to her abuser, she may have inadvertently placed her coworkers in jeopardy of attack. Husband’s conduct in disparaging Wife when receiving calls for her employment verification (1 R. 69) reveals a pattern of harassment which may well result in him disrupting her employment in the future, should he learn where she works. This is not uncommon behavior, by any means, for abusers to engage in^[5].

While there is no Florida case law directly on point in regards to a challenge to the confidentiality of a domestic violence victim’s home and work address, in 1998, the Supreme Court of Florida clarified in Amendments to the Florida Family Law Rules of Procedure 723 So. 2d 208, 209 (Fla.1998) that under Rule 2.051, a trial court had discretion to seal financial records in a family law case if it was shown that "third parties are likely to use this information in an abusive manner." Certainly, disclosing Wife’s home and/or work addresses to her husband, a man who had committed multiple acts of domestic violence against her, would have allowed him to use this information in an abusive manner.

The trial court departed from the essential requirements of law and, had Wife complied with the trial court’s order to disclose her home and work addresses, it could have resulted in material harm that could not be remedied on appeal. Had Husband harmed his Wife further – or even worse, murdered her – it would have been very much of a “cat out of bag” situation that once disclosed, could not have been reversed, similar to Nucci v. Nucci, 987 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2008).

One case of potential relevance is found in the Supreme Court of New Jersey, Sacharow v. Sacharow, 826 A. 2nd 710 (NJ Supreme Court 2003). In that case, the Wife had not been granted an order of protection, but had enrolled in New Jersey’s Address Confidentiality Program. The parties had a minor child and Husband alleged that he had a right to know the living conditions of his child. However, of potential interest to this court is the footnote No. 3 authored by Justice Long:

“We do not anticipate a challenge to address confidentiality generally or to ACP status in particular in cases that do not involve children. It is hard to imagine why a party without children would need to know his spouse or former spouse's address. To be sure, there might be residual financial entanglements between them, but those easily could be overseen by the Probation Department or another intermediary without the need for personal contact.”

It is also hard in the instant case to imagine why Husband was so determined to know his Wife’s address that he persevered through numerous motions and court orders to obtain it. Husband’s counsel stated there was “absolutely no real fear” [emphasis added] that Husband was going to go after her (1 Tr. 5, lines 1-3). The trial court did not ask him to define what he meant by “real fear”. Does it mean there was “some” fear? Wife believes so, and the nation’s domestic violence statistics confirm. One need only read a newspaper to learn about recent cases of homicide where domestic violence was involved.

Ordering Wife to disclose her home addresses to her Husband’s counsel – while Husband could access the file by simply requesting a copy – and her work address to her Husband directly, denied her statutory and constitutional rights to defend her life and liberty and to enjoy happiness, and was an abuse of discretion. In the interest of Wife’s personal safety in the instant case, the trial court could have conducted an “in camera” review of Wife’s address and work addresses; or, in the alternative, appointed an intermediary to review and authenticate the disclosures.

The lower tribunal continues to disregard Wife’s need for confidential address which places her life in jeopardy. Wife filed a second Request for Confidential Filing of Address on June 28, after her pleadings were stricken (2 R. 255). The clerk informed Wife during compilation of the Record on Appeal, that this request would continue to be part of the public record, accessible to anyone, showing her address, until the judge rules differently. As of the date of filing, that has not occurred.

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^[1] “Separated women are three times more likely than divorced women and twenty-five times more likely than married women still living with their husbands to be victimized by a batterer.”

36 Judges’ Journal (1997), “Fairness and Accuracy in Evaluation of Domestic Violence and Child Abuse on Custody Determinations” (http://www.csaj.org/documents/212.pdf accessed 9/23/2012.)

^[2] “Between 67 percent and 80 percent of female intimate partner homicide victims have been previously battered by their murderer.”
The Florida Bar Journal, March 2004, Volume LXXVIII, No. 3, “A Lawyer’s Guide to Assessing Dangerousness for Domestic Violence” (http://www.floridabar.org/DIVCOM/JN/JNJournal01.nsf/4f0361bef4af101e85256f4e004d0fef/a064c543ab7e7d3785256e43004fcb02?OpenDocument accessed 9/23/12)

^[3] “The Legislature finds that persons attempting to escape from actual or threatened domestic violence frequently establish new addresses in order to prevent their assailants or probable assailants from finding them.” 
Section 741.401, Florida Statutes.

^[4] “Generally, 70% of domestic violence victims are employed and over 70% of them report that the abusers harassed them at work, either over the telephone or in person.” 
American Bar Association, “The Domestic Violence Safety Plan” (http://apps.americanbar.org/tips/publicservice/dvsafety.html accessed 9/23/2012)

^[5] “More dramatically, albeit relatively rarely, perpetrators attack victims or their coworkers at work.  … Batterers can be extremely creative and dogged in their efforts to disrupt victims’ employment. … For example, one of my clients, a social worker, was fired after her ex-husband called her employer …  (Significantly, this occurred after my client had left her husband; he began harassing her at work when he no longer knew where she lived.)” Florida State University Law Review, Vol. 35-669 “Domestic Violence and the Workplace:  The Explosion of State Legislation and the Need for a Comprehensive Strategy,”, (http://www.law.fsu.edu/journals/lawreview/downloads/353/widiss.pdf accessed 9/23/2012.)