In his Answer Brief, he countered my statement. I very briefly addressed his counterstatement in my Reply Brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
This is an appeal from a final judgment of dissolution of marriage. The parties were married on April 7, 2001, and remained married for ten (10) years with no offspring. On March 14, 2011, Husband was arrested and charged with the felony crime of Aggravated Assault with a Deadly Weapon (1 R. 75 & 138) when he placed a latex glove on his hand, picked up an empty wine bottle and told his Wife he was going to hit and kill her (1 R. 75). The following day, Wife was granted a Temporary Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence (Exhibit “A”[1]) (hereinafter the “Temporary Injunction”). Husband filed for dissolution a week later on March 22 (1 R. 1-4). Two weeks after his arrest – during a hearing on the Temporary Injunction – Husband agreed to continue the Injunction indefinitely. An Agreed Permanent Injunction Against Domestic Violence (2 R. 210-218) was thereafter entered, without Husband challenging or denying any of the sixteen acts of violence he committed against his Wife.At the heart of this matter lies the question of whether Wife – a domestic violence victim in fear for her life from her abusive Husband – should have been ordered, during discovery, to disclose her new home and work addresses (in another state, and almost a year later) to her abusive Husband. Denial of Wife’s Motion for Protective Order (2 R. 208-218) (which asked the trial court to allow Wife to redact her new home and work addresses from disclosures), ultimately led to her pleadings being stricken with prejudice (2 R. 241-242). Thereafter, Wife was defaulted and prohibited from participating in the final default hearing (1 R. 256).
Throughout the proceedings, Wife demonstrated good reason to fear further abuse or even homicide from her Husband. Within days of his arrest, Husband diverted – for his own benefit – all the income from the family pool service business “[Family Business]” (1 R. 38-43 & 139). At that time, and throughout most of the marriage, the business was Wife’s sole source of income (1 R. 139). On March 29, 2011, Husband set up his own new similarly-named business “[Husband's New Business]” (1 R. 39, 138 & 141). Without Wife’s knowledge, Husband directed the customers of [Family Business] to pay that new business instead (1 R. 39 & 139).
Wife, upon learning of Husband’s misconduct regarding the business, filed a Motion for Temporary Injunction From Depletion of Assets and Business (1 R. 38-43) asking that his new company cease and desist. Unfortunately, the trial court’s administrative rules did not allow setting temporary relief hearings until after mediation, and Husband refused to submit to mediation. Therefore, Wife was unable to seek any relief regarding his misconduct.
During the first two weeks after his arrest, Husband confiscated Wife’s mail from the mailbox daily[2]. When (during the Hearing on the Temporary Injunction) Husband was ordered to no longer enter the Woodbine housing development (where the marital home is located, which had been temporarily awarded to Wife) (2 R. 211), he changed his Wife’s mailing address to his new address on the USPS.com website, without Wife’s consent or knowledge (2 R. 257).
Husband charged his legal fees to Wife’s personal business account (an account which predated the marriage) in the total amount of $7,500 (1 R. 140 & 2 R. 258). He also made substantial cash withdrawals from the same account in amounts of $500 per day and continued to charge his business expenses to Wife’s account for another three months (1 R. 140) in the total amount of $12,566.70 (2 R. 258) (until she closed the account in May 2011) – even though, by then, his new business was receiving all the business income (1 R. 39, 138 & 2 R. 256). This misconduct caused severe economic hardship for his Wife (1 R. 79 & 140). However, without mediation, Wife could seek no relief from the lower tribunal.
In addition, Husband shut off water and garbage collection in the marital home temporarily awarded to Wife (2 R. 258). Without water, Wife was unable to continue to live in the marital home. With hope that her Husband would no longer be able to harass her if she no longer resided in Florida, Wife relocated to the state of Maryland (1 R. 140) – an area where public transportation was readily accessible – a prerequisite for Wife, who has never driven, due to a seizure disorder (1 R. 2 & 2 Tr. 12, lines 12-16). Renting her own apartment, Wife entered a counseling program for domestic violence victims, and enrolled in Maryland’s Address Confidentiality Program. She also registered the Agreed Final Injunction in Maryland, and filed a request for confidential address with the trial court in Florida[3].
Wife began applying for employment, listing the family business “[Family Business]” as her last place of employment. To her dismay, when Wife inquired of potential employers as to why she was not being hired, she learned that upon calling to verify her previous employment, Husband was making disparaging remarks about her (1 R. 69).
Eleven months into the dissolution proceedings, on February 17, 2011, with no discovery disclosures made by either party, Husband’s counsel sent Wife – by email – a motion to compel her discovery (1 R. 61-62). Wife had never communicated with Husband’s counsel directly before. Wife immediately prepared a response to the motion and sent it to Husband’s counsel via email (1 R. 71-74) the following day (February 18) explaining that she did not have copies of the discovery requests. She asked Husband’s counsel to send her copies so that she could respond. While Husband’s counsel replied to her email, he ignored both her response to his motion and her request for copies of discovery requests. Instead, he inquired whether she would attend mediation telephonically. This was how Wife learned that unbeknownst to her, more than a month beforehand, without serving her notice thereof, Husband had noticed and set a trial date for June 18, 2012 (1 R. 55 & 60), and a mediation date of February 29, 2012 (1 R. 56-59).
Although Wife’s response to the motion to compel discovery was sent both by facsimile and U.S. certified mail to the trial court, and appears in the record (1 R. 71-74), it was, somehow, overlooked, and Husband’s counsel did not bring it to the attention of the trial court. Husband’s order compelling Wife’s discovery was entered, sanctioning her in the amount of $350 (1 R. 70). Wife filed an ex parte motion to vacate the order (1 R. 121-126) based on the fact that Husband’s counsel ignored her response, but her motion to vacate was also ignored by the trial court, and the clerk refused to set a hearing date.
The mediation order (1 R. 57) required a Financial Affidavit be filed and brought to mediation. Wife immediately filed hers (1 R. 158-173), expecting Husband to do the same. He did not. Both parties attended mediation (Wife telephonically). Husband appeared without a Financial Affidavit and mediation was an impasse (1 R. 120) with Husband refusing to settle, and the mediator having no financial information from Husband on which to mediate settlement.
Ignoring all of Wife’s repeated emails asking for copies of the discovery requests so that she could respond, Husband filed a motion for contempt (1 R. 131-133) alleging that Wife refused to comply. Of note is that Husband had not complied with any of Wife’s discovery requests.
In fear of what could happen, especially because Husband sought relief which included her incarceration (1 R. 131), Wife borrowed funds from a friend to retain an attorney. Her attorney immediately filed a motion to compel Husband’s discovery (1 R. 136-137) on April 19, which was granted, sanctioning Husband in the amount of $350 (1 R. 142).
Wife’s counsel also filed and set for hearing a motion for temporary relief (1 R. 138-141) requesting attorney’s fees so that the parties could be placed on equal footing[4].
By that time, Wife was fortunate enough to have secured a temporary employment assignment scheduled to last until the end of May. When he learned of her assignment, Husband’s counsel demanded, more than a year after dissolution proceedings had been initiated, that Wife’s counsel provide him with a date on which he could immediately take Wife’s deposition. Wife’s counsel responded that she would be available at his convenience at any time after June 1. Husband demanded an earlier date and filed a motion to compel Wife’s deposition (1 R. 190-192) alleging, among other things, that Wife had a history of not appearing at depositions (1 R. 190). No deposition had ever been previously set in the dissolution case; however Husband alleged that Wife failed to appear at a deposition in his criminal case (1 R. 190). That had not occurred and was completely irrelevant to the case at hand[5].
At the first of four hearings in regards to discovery, the trial court ordered that Wife’s deposition take place before the temporary relief hearing scheduled for June 1 (5 Tr. 6, lines 6-9 & 5 Tr. 7, lines 10-15). An order was subsequently entered that the deposition would take place on May 23 (1 R. 195), on the face of which it states:
“Because the Wife resides out of the State of Florida and has not disclosed her address, the Wife shall appear at a location designated by Wife’s counsel…” (1 R. 195, ¶2).Both Wife and her counsel clearly interpreted this order to mean that Husband would not be aware of the exact address at which Wife would attend her deposition. As long as Wife’s safety was protected, she was more than willing to be deposed.
Husband’s counsel finally supplied copies of his discovery requests to Wife’s counsel. Thereafter, Wife complied with all of them in writing, supplying everything requested which was in her possession (1 R. 179-189). However, Wife redacted information which identified her current home and work addresses in order to maintain her safety from further abuse. Certain bank statements were not in Wife’s possession as Husband had confiscated all her mail during the years they cohabitated. Therefore Wife was unable to produce the requested statements and provided a detailed written response stating these facts (1 R 179-189[6]).
Husband, dissatisfied with his Wife’s discovery responses because they did not disclose her current address, proceeded with his previously scheduled hearing on his motion for contempt, despite Wife’s substantial compliance with discovery. The trial court was informed of Wife’s substantial compliance and provided copies of documents produced (4 Tr. 4, line 4[7]). However, Wife was ordered to fully comply by May 21, warning that if she did not, her pleadings would be stricken (4 Tr. 4, lines 1-3 & 1 R. 199). Wife’s counsel argued that detailed responses had already been provided for the missing documents (4 Tr. 5, lines 3-6). The trial court warned again that it would strike Wife’s pleadings unless she complied fully within ten (10) days (4 Tr. 5, lines 7-9).
After the hearing, Counsel substantially disagreed with each other regarding the order to be entered, and submitted competing orders to the trial court. Husband filed a motion to enter his order (2 R. 219-220); not the order which Wife’s counsel had drafted. However, by that time, Husband’s order had already been entered (1 R. 196-199).
In grave concern for her safety, Wife filed a motion for protective order (2 R. 208-218) officially asking the trial court’s permission to redact from her discovery responses, any information that would reveal to her Husband where she lived and worked. Although the Injunction for Protection Against Domestic Violence was then (and is now) still in effect against Husband, the “lion’s share” of Wife’s motion was denied (2 R. 223). Husband’s counsel argued that there was “absolutely no real fear” of Husband “going anywhere near her” (1 Tr. 5, lines 1-3). The trial court found that “With all the different claims that are in the petition, they’re entitled to the information,” (1 Tr. 5, lines 7-9) despite Wife’s counsel’s argument that information in an attorney’s file is available to a client (1 Tr. 3, lines 16-20). At Wife’s counsel’s insistence, the trial court asked Husband’s counsel, as a courtesy, to refrain from giving his client (i.e., Husband) his Wife’s address (1 Tr. 6, lines 1-4). The trial court denied Wife’s request for confidentiality of her work address, finding that: “I mean the work is a public place, isn’t it?” (1 Tr. 6, lines 18-19)
Thus, the Wife was ordered to provide her home address to Husband’s counsel and to provide her work address to her Husband (2 R. 223). However, because Wife is not able to drive (1 R. 2), if Husband discovers where she works, he could easily follow her home from work on public transportation. Ipso de facto, therefore, her motion for protective order was completely denied.
After reviewing Husband’s discovery responses and realizing they were not complete, Wife filed a motion for continuance of the trial (2 R. 221-222) to address missing discovery, and also, review the parties’ tax liability which should have been part of equitable distribution.
Immediately thereafter, Husband filed a notice of video deposition listing the specific address at which Wife was to appear (2 R. 224-225). Wife, fearing for her safety if Husband knew the exact location and time she would be present, quickly asked for a different location to be set by her attorney, in compliance with the order (1 R. 195). Husband refused. Wife was too afraid to attend the deposition if Husband knew the time and place she would be, and assumed it could be reset because the trial court had given no warning of sanctions if she did not attend.
Wife’s second set of discovery disclosures, as ordered during the hearing on the Motion for Contempt (4 Tr. 3-5) was transmitted via email, by Wife’s counsel (2 R. 226). The exact moment at which Wife’s counsel sent the email(s) is unclear. However, according to Husband’s counsel, the disclosures were received shortly after the court-ordered deadline of 5:00 p.m. on May 21 (2 R. 226). Such late transmission appears to have been de minimis. However, Wife did not provide her home or work addresses, and again, responded in writing that some bank statements were missing because they were not in her possession. Husband immediately filed a motion to strike her pleadings (1 R. 226-240) based on Wife’s non-disclosure of her home and work addresses, non-attendance at the deposition, the missing bank statements which were not in Wife’s possession, and Wife’s counsel’s late transmission.
Wife filed a motion opposing striking her pleadings (2 R. 243-245) wherein Wife’s counsel stated that she had been focused on settlement [not the deposition or discovery deadline]. She also argued again that disclosure of Wife’s home and work addresses should be protected and were irrelevant.
During the hearing on the motion to strike, the trial court quickly struck all of Wife’s pleadings (3 Tr. 5, lines 1-2) finding first: “Well, it’s not really an extreme remedy because that’s what I said I was going to do without strict compliance with the prior order, particularly with the deposition” (3 Tr. 4, lines 18-20). Then, the trial court stated: “It’s an extreme remedy, but we kind of got pushed into that.” (3 Tr. 5, lines 8-9).
Wife’s counsel, realizing that she was not going to be able to proceed with the motion for temporary relief and be awarded attorney’s fees now that Wife’s pleading were stricken, immediately thereafter filed a motion to withdraw (2 R. 246) which was granted (2 R. 249), leaving Wife, once again with no legal representation.
Husband, without notice to Wife, proceeded to a final default hearing on June 18, 2012 (2 Tr. 1-19), from which Wife was barred from participating (2 R. 256). At the hearing, Husband was awarded all the marital assets listed in his “equitable distribution schedule” (2 R. 253-254) which he presented at the hearing (i.e., the marital home, and three vehicles, including a valuable Corvette) (2 Tr. 8-10 & 12).
His schedule, however, omitted [Family Business] (2 R. 253-254), the family business, entirely, the parties’ most valuable asset, as if it has never existed. The valuation date of the assets was set at March 22, 2011 (2 R. 250), the same date on which Husband filed for dissolution. On that date, [Family Business] was still operated by Husband and Wife, and Husband had not yet even registered a fictitious name for his new business [Husband's New Business] (1 R. 38 & 139). Therefore, [Family Business] should have been included in equitable distribution.
The trial court did not question why the family business was omitted – even though the family business had been referenced in Husband’s pleadings from inception of the case (1 R. 29-30) and the business bank statements had been hotly contested during hearings (1 R. 190 & 2 R. 227).
Husband’s asset schedule attributed funds to Wife in the amount of $63,100 (2 R. 253). Husband committed perjury testifying such funds had been withdrawn from a “joint account[8]” (2 Tr. 10, lines 7-16) even though he was fully aware that the account had been Wife’s sole business account which predated the marriage (1 R. 76 ). Husband committed further perjury stating that Wife was still in possession of the funds (2 Tr. 10, lines 22-23). He knew that she had never had all of those funds available to her as she had replaced some of the funds in her business account while Husband withdrew from and charged to the account (2 R. 240 & 240) without her consent, and that she had used the remainder to survive, as indicated by her financial affidavit (1 R. 158-173).
None of the funds Husband withdrew from the same account, including those used to pay $7,500 (2 R. 240) of his legal fees and almost $13,000 of business expenses (2 R. 248) were attributed to Husband on his schedule of assets.
Husband thereby established that Wife owed him the hefty figure of $20,718 as an “equalizing” payment to give each party an “equal” share of the assets (2 Tr. 14, line 8). The trial court appears to have initially found it remarkable that Husband was being awarded a house, three vehicles, plus this large “equalizing” payment – especially since the trial court had been made aware just a few weeks before on May 18, that Wife had no funds to pay her attorney (5 Tr. 3, lines 19-24 & 20-24). Thus, the trial court asked for confirmation that the distribution was equal before signing the order, and Husband’s counsel testified that it was equal (2 Tr. 17, lines 2-4). The trial court reiterated: “Each party is getting the same amount of assets?” (2 Tr. 17, lines 7-8) To which, Husband’s counsel replied: “That’s correct, other than the attorney’s fees, your Honor.” (2 Tr. 17, lines 7-8). The trial court did not inquire further.
Husband was also granted $10,155.50 in attorney’s fees, cost and suit money, for sanctions resulting from Wife’s “vexatious and overly litigious conduct” (2 Tr. 15, lines 6-23). However, the trial court had never previously found that Wife’s conduct was vexatious and overly litigious during the proceedings. Husband’s attorney testified that Husband was entitled to reimbursement of fees for Husband’s Motion to Compel, his Motion to Compel Wife’s Deposition, his Motion for Contempt, Wife’s Motion for Protective Order, and Husband’s Motion to Strike Wife’s Pleadings (2 Tr. 15, lines 11-23). He did not, of course, testify that he had already charged $7,500 of Husband’s legal fees to Wife’s account (1 R. 140 & 2 R. 258) and that his schedule of assets and liabilities attributed that $7,500 to Wife. Therefore, he was actually asking for those fees to be duplicated.
The trial court never addressed whether or not the sanctions were fair, or whether Wife could even afford to pay such a huge amount; although it was fully aware of Wife’s dire financial situation from her financial affidavit (1 R. 63-69), and Wife’s counsel’s testimony that she could not afford to pay for legal representation (5 Tr. 3, lines 19-24).
The final judgment orders Wife to pay her Husband the small fortune of $30,873.50 (1 R. 252). This judgment grants Husband the legal right, yet again, to track down and locate his Wife, and to garnish her bank accounts and wages, in order to pursue collection. Wife fears Husband will kill her if he finds her.
Thus, the Wife was ordered to provide her home address to Husband’s counsel and to provide her work address to her Husband (2 R. 223). However, because Wife is not able to drive (1 R. 2), if Husband discovers where she works, he could easily follow her home from work on public transportation. Ipso de facto, therefore, her motion for protective order was completely denied.
After reviewing Husband’s discovery responses and realizing they were not complete, Wife filed a motion for continuance of the trial (2 R. 221-222) to address missing discovery, and also, review the parties’ tax liability which should have been part of equitable distribution.
Immediately thereafter, Husband filed a notice of video deposition listing the specific address at which Wife was to appear (2 R. 224-225). Wife, fearing for her safety if Husband knew the exact location and time she would be present, quickly asked for a different location to be set by her attorney, in compliance with the order (1 R. 195). Husband refused. Wife was too afraid to attend the deposition if Husband knew the time and place she would be, and assumed it could be reset because the trial court had given no warning of sanctions if she did not attend.
Wife’s second set of discovery disclosures, as ordered during the hearing on the Motion for Contempt (4 Tr. 3-5) was transmitted via email, by Wife’s counsel (2 R. 226). The exact moment at which Wife’s counsel sent the email(s) is unclear. However, according to Husband’s counsel, the disclosures were received shortly after the court-ordered deadline of 5:00 p.m. on May 21 (2 R. 226). Such late transmission appears to have been de minimis. However, Wife did not provide her home or work addresses, and again, responded in writing that some bank statements were missing because they were not in her possession. Husband immediately filed a motion to strike her pleadings (1 R. 226-240) based on Wife’s non-disclosure of her home and work addresses, non-attendance at the deposition, the missing bank statements which were not in Wife’s possession, and Wife’s counsel’s late transmission.
Wife filed a motion opposing striking her pleadings (2 R. 243-245) wherein Wife’s counsel stated that she had been focused on settlement [not the deposition or discovery deadline]. She also argued again that disclosure of Wife’s home and work addresses should be protected and were irrelevant.
During the hearing on the motion to strike, the trial court quickly struck all of Wife’s pleadings (3 Tr. 5, lines 1-2) finding first: “Well, it’s not really an extreme remedy because that’s what I said I was going to do without strict compliance with the prior order, particularly with the deposition” (3 Tr. 4, lines 18-20). Then, the trial court stated: “It’s an extreme remedy, but we kind of got pushed into that.” (3 Tr. 5, lines 8-9).
Wife’s counsel, realizing that she was not going to be able to proceed with the motion for temporary relief and be awarded attorney’s fees now that Wife’s pleading were stricken, immediately thereafter filed a motion to withdraw (2 R. 246) which was granted (2 R. 249), leaving Wife, once again with no legal representation.
Husband, without notice to Wife, proceeded to a final default hearing on June 18, 2012 (2 Tr. 1-19), from which Wife was barred from participating (2 R. 256). At the hearing, Husband was awarded all the marital assets listed in his “equitable distribution schedule” (2 R. 253-254) which he presented at the hearing (i.e., the marital home, and three vehicles, including a valuable Corvette) (2 Tr. 8-10 & 12).
His schedule, however, omitted [Family Business] (2 R. 253-254), the family business, entirely, the parties’ most valuable asset, as if it has never existed. The valuation date of the assets was set at March 22, 2011 (2 R. 250), the same date on which Husband filed for dissolution. On that date, [Family Business] was still operated by Husband and Wife, and Husband had not yet even registered a fictitious name for his new business [Husband's New Business] (1 R. 38 & 139). Therefore, [Family Business] should have been included in equitable distribution.
The trial court did not question why the family business was omitted – even though the family business had been referenced in Husband’s pleadings from inception of the case (1 R. 29-30) and the business bank statements had been hotly contested during hearings (1 R. 190 & 2 R. 227).
Husband’s asset schedule attributed funds to Wife in the amount of $63,100 (2 R. 253). Husband committed perjury testifying such funds had been withdrawn from a “joint account[8]” (2 Tr. 10, lines 7-16) even though he was fully aware that the account had been Wife’s sole business account which predated the marriage (1 R. 76 ). Husband committed further perjury stating that Wife was still in possession of the funds (2 Tr. 10, lines 22-23). He knew that she had never had all of those funds available to her as she had replaced some of the funds in her business account while Husband withdrew from and charged to the account (2 R. 240 & 240) without her consent, and that she had used the remainder to survive, as indicated by her financial affidavit (1 R. 158-173).
None of the funds Husband withdrew from the same account, including those used to pay $7,500 (2 R. 240) of his legal fees and almost $13,000 of business expenses (2 R. 248) were attributed to Husband on his schedule of assets.
Husband thereby established that Wife owed him the hefty figure of $20,718 as an “equalizing” payment to give each party an “equal” share of the assets (2 Tr. 14, line 8). The trial court appears to have initially found it remarkable that Husband was being awarded a house, three vehicles, plus this large “equalizing” payment – especially since the trial court had been made aware just a few weeks before on May 18, that Wife had no funds to pay her attorney (5 Tr. 3, lines 19-24 & 20-24). Thus, the trial court asked for confirmation that the distribution was equal before signing the order, and Husband’s counsel testified that it was equal (2 Tr. 17, lines 2-4). The trial court reiterated: “Each party is getting the same amount of assets?” (2 Tr. 17, lines 7-8) To which, Husband’s counsel replied: “That’s correct, other than the attorney’s fees, your Honor.” (2 Tr. 17, lines 7-8). The trial court did not inquire further.
Husband was also granted $10,155.50 in attorney’s fees, cost and suit money, for sanctions resulting from Wife’s “vexatious and overly litigious conduct” (2 Tr. 15, lines 6-23). However, the trial court had never previously found that Wife’s conduct was vexatious and overly litigious during the proceedings. Husband’s attorney testified that Husband was entitled to reimbursement of fees for Husband’s Motion to Compel, his Motion to Compel Wife’s Deposition, his Motion for Contempt, Wife’s Motion for Protective Order, and Husband’s Motion to Strike Wife’s Pleadings (2 Tr. 15, lines 11-23). He did not, of course, testify that he had already charged $7,500 of Husband’s legal fees to Wife’s account (1 R. 140 & 2 R. 258) and that his schedule of assets and liabilities attributed that $7,500 to Wife. Therefore, he was actually asking for those fees to be duplicated.
The trial court never addressed whether or not the sanctions were fair, or whether Wife could even afford to pay such a huge amount; although it was fully aware of Wife’s dire financial situation from her financial affidavit (1 R. 63-69), and Wife’s counsel’s testimony that she could not afford to pay for legal representation (5 Tr. 3, lines 19-24).
The final judgment orders Wife to pay her Husband the small fortune of $30,873.50 (1 R. 252). This judgment grants Husband the legal right, yet again, to track down and locate his Wife, and to garnish her bank accounts and wages, in order to pursue collection. Wife fears Husband will kill her if he finds her.
Wife filed a timely motion for reconsideration (1 R. 256-313), detailing Husband’s fraud in (a) omitting the family business, (b) the funds he had withdrawn/charged, and (c) the resulting lack of equitable distribution of the assets. The trial court denied without explanation. Therefore, Wife filed this appeal.
[1] The Final Agreed Injunction (2 R. 210-218) continued the Temporary Injunction which was, therefore, ipso de facto, before the lower tribunal. The Temporary Injunction was also referenced by Appellee’s counsel in two separate hearings (1 Tr. 4, lines 18-20 & 2 Tr. 5, lines 6-7) and was listed as “related” in the original petition for dissolution, thereby “opening the door” for its inclusion herein. This court has authority and jurisdiction to consider any issues affecting the case and the issue of domestic violence permeated various rulings of the lower tribunal and is of particular relevance in this appeal. (Dralus v. Dralus, 627 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1993); Cantor v. Davis, 489 So. 2d 18, 20 (Fla. 1986))
[5] Criminal charges were Nolle Prossed in September 2011, when Husband refused to accept a plea bargain. At the time the charges were Nolle Prossed, a deposition had been scheduled, but was cancelled by the prosecutor.
[6] Wife’s discovery responses were served upon Husband’s counsel on May 3, 2012, and notice was filed with the lower tribunal, as noted in the Record at this page reference. However, the actual responses were not filed with the lower tribunal and, therefore, are not contained in the Record.
[7] Several minutes of the hearing had been conducted before the court reporter (retained by Husband) came on the record for the transcript – per Husband’s counsel’s instruction. However, the Judge states: “Let me give these back to you all …” as she obviously returns the documents which had been produced.
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